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Abstract This paper argues that hydrocarbon producers
with high rents per capita constitute a specific category in the
broader universe of rent-dependent countries, facing a
specific set of development challenges that are not shared by
mid-rent countries. It surveys patterns of rent distribution in
high-rent countries (HRCs), focusing on energy subsidies
and excessive public employment, and argues that these
result in declining energy efficiency and labor productivity
as well as exclusion of nationals from the private labor
market. It then proposes unconditional cash grants for HRC
citizens in combinationwith subsidy and public employment
reform as amitigation strategy tominimize theHRC-specific
distortive effects of rent distribution. It is shown that none of
the conventional counterarguments to unconditional cash
grants applies in the context of HRCs.
Keywords Energy subsidies  Rentier states  Wealth
distribution  Gulf monarchies  Public employment 
Unconditional basic income
Introduction
The discussion on the ‘‘resource curse’’ has increasingly
moved into the terrain of policy prescriptions. One of the
most prominent proposals to avoid some of the pathologies
that natural resource wealth can engender is the direct
distribution of resource rents to the population. This paper
seeks to add to the growing literature on cash grants in
rentier states by focusing on their potential impact in a
particular class of resource-rich states in the developing
world: countries with very high per capita resource rents,
which are starting to be recognized as a category of their
own [1–3].
Such high-rent countries (or HRCs)—a limited number
of mostly small-population resource exporters in the
developing world—face somewhat different, yet in many
ways as daunting development challenges as the mid-rent
countries on which much of the resource curse debate has
traditionally focused. These challenges, which have never
been systematically analyzed, are surveyed in the first half
of this paper, focusing in particular on excessive public
employment and provision of energy subsidies, both of
which are deeply economically distortive. The second half
of the paper then makes the case that direct cash grants for
HRC citizens are a more economically efficient, fair, and
politically palatable distributive tool that should replace
excess government employment and energy subsidies. As
we will see, the case for such a ‘‘citizens’ income’’ is even
stronger for HRCs than for mid-rent countries: while
retaining most of the redeeming features that cash grants
are argued to have in the rentier state universe at large, they
would be easier to finance and justify, involve less acute
trade-offs, and most importantly help overcome HRC-
specific development challenges.
The paper contributes to several literatures: the resource
curse and rentier state debates, the debate about subsidy
reform in the developing world, and the broader literature
on the ‘‘basic income’’ concept that extends beyond poli-
tics, development, and economics into political philosophy
and whose useful insights (and caveats) are often ignored
in the rentier cash grants discussion. By showing how
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direct cash grants can substitute for cheap, fossil-based
energy, it provides a rough political and economic roadmap
for facilitating broader energy transitions in HRCs, par-
ticularly the very energy-intensive GCC.
Selection of cases
Any cut-off point to define high-rent status is arbitrary:
‘‘HRC’’ is not a discrete empirical category but rather an ideal
type which countries tend to approach as their per capita rents
increase. To select cases for the empirical illustrations in this
paper, a threshold of 3000 USD per year has been chosen,
resulting in the 11 countries, as shown in Fig. 1. Thresholds of
2000 or 4000 USD do not materially change results, and
neither does the use of longer term averages. Seven of the 11
cases lie in theMiddle East region, two in sub-SaharanAfrica,
one in Asia, and one in the Caribbean.
To situate HRCs in the wider rentier universe, we occa-
sionally include mid-rent countries (MRCs) with rents
between 500 and 3000 USD in this paper. In 2011, 13 non-
OECD cases fell into this category: Algeria, Angola, Azer-
baijan, Congo-Brazzaville, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan,
Malaysia, Russia, Syria, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela.
Current outcomes in rentier states
With the potential exception of Equatorial Guinea, all HRC
regimes appear to feel a political need to share their resource
wealth with the wider population. The way this is done,
however—with cheap energy and public sector over-em-
ployment playing a leading role1—is uniquely inefficient.
While these forms of distribution might have been jus-
tifiable at times of excess hydrocarbon production capacity
and low domestic consumption, and when populations
were smaller and state apparatuses just being built, they
have now become extremely costly. Cheap energy and
excessive public employment are inefficient, regressive,
and often exclusive tools of distribution, with deleterious
consequences for non-oil diversification, fiscal sustain-
ability, and, in the long run, the potential of local societies
to find a growth-oriented compromise between national
workers and business. Data used below are from various
years, which are a function of availability.
Energy subsidies
Energy subsidies in the developing world have been widely
discussed in recent years [4–7]. Cheap energy is typically
provided through transport fuel, gas, and electricity that are
sold far below international market prices.2 Available lit-
erature demonstrates convincingly that distribution of rents
through cheap energy is regressive, disproportionately
benefiting richer households [10]. Different from subsi-
dized public services like health and education, energy
consumption also entails negative environmental exter-
nalities. Very low consumer and industrial energy prices
also make the transition towards more sustainable forms of
energy difficult—despite the advantageous geography of
many HRCs, notably the GCC countries, which enjoy
abundant, continuous sunshine.
The size of implicit subsidies can be tricky to estimate:
not all types of energy are easily exportable, and it is not
clear whether all of the potentially ‘‘liberated’’ energy
production could be exported without pushing international
prices downwards [11]. However, even under restrictive
assumptions, subsidies are very substantial for most of the
countries under study, and their regressive distributional
impact and negative externalities obtain independent of
their direct fiscal opportunity cost. For the purposes of this
paper, we will use the IMF’s 2011 energy subsidy esti-
mates, which are comparable across countries. They show
that with the exception of Gabon and Equatorial Guinea,3
our cases lie far above the global average of .7% of GDP.
Mid-rent countries also have substantial, but for the most
part lower energy subsidies (Fig. 2).4
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Fig. 1 Developing countries with per capita oil and gas rents above
3000 USD (2013) Source: calculated from 2015 World Development
Indicators
1 There are of course many other forms of rent distribution, including
free or subsidized public services, non-salary transfers, preferential
contracts for local business etc. Their scale is relatively smaller
however, they are often less distortionary, have fewer negative
externalities and are harder to compare across countries.
2 Average diesel and gasoline prices in HRCs e.g. were less than half
of the US benchmark price in 2010; if Gabon is left out, average
prices were about a third [8]. Electricity and natural gas prices in
some cases are even lower [9].
3 As recently as 2006, Gabon’s fuel subsidies alone were estimated at
2% of GDP [12]; the more recent estimates seem to reflect subsequent
pricing reforms.
4 The median subsidy estimate is 5.7% of GDP for HRCs and 3.8%
for MRCs.
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Several HRCs have recently undertaken partial subsidy
reforms [13, 14] and implicit subsidies have also fallen because
of lower international energy prices. Nonetheless, prices for the
most part remain significantly below international levels.
Typically, the hydrocarbons sector uses only a small
fraction of total energy, although it constitutes half or more
of GDPs in our cases. This means that the energy subsidy
rates in the non-hydrocarbon economy are even higher than
for the total economy. They are higher yet relative to a
counterfactual in which environmental externalities and
foregone tax revenue are considered [10]. Whatever mea-
sure for subsidies is used, their share in government rev-
enue is typically more than twice as high as that in (total)
GDP, reflecting enormous foregone revenue.
Over the last 3 decades, domestic energy consumption
has increased above population growth and, in most cases,
above GDP growth (see Figs. 5, 6). In 2010, average per
capita energy consumption in our cases was 1.5 times the
average of the world’s high-income countries.5 Anecdo-
tally, much consumption is frivolous, caused by bad insu-
lation, inefficient equipment, and gas-guzzling vehicles
that are incentivized by low prices, hence adding little to
citizens’ welfare [15].
In some cases, most notably Saudi Arabia, growing
domestic consumption has started to threaten that coun-
tries’ hydrocarbons export capacity, further reducing
potential government revenue [7, 9].
Labor market outcomes
Over-employment of citizens in the public sector under
generous conditions is the second main channel of mass rent
circulation that all our HRCs’ bar Equatorial Guinea have
engaged in, and it is the distribution tool that truly sets them
apart from other rentiers. Combined with large-scale labor
migration (see Fig. 3), government job guarantees typically
result in a large public sector dominated by nationals and a
private sector with a strong or dominant presence of foreign
workers (see Fig. 46). Only Trinidad and Tobago forms an
exception to the migrant dependence pattern, possibly as a
result of its domestic tradition of low-wage plantation labor
(the World Bank’s figure for the second apparent HRC
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Fig. 2 Pre-tax Energy Subsidies, 2011 (% of GDP). Source: [10]
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Fig. 3 Hydrocarbons rent per capita versus migrant population
(2010). Source: based on World Bank Development Indicators
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Fig. 4 Labor market structures (2009 unless marked otherwise).
Sources: national authorities, World Bank and IMF
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Fig. 5 Energy use (kg of oil equivalent) per $1000 GDP (constant
2005 PPP) Source: World Bank Development Indicators
5 Based on World Development Indicators.
6 No labor market data were available for Equatorial Guinea;
different from other HRCs, its public sector appears to be rather
small as most rents are siphoned off by corrupt political elites [17].
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outlier Equatorial Guinea (GHQ) is probably wrong, as press
reports indicate a migrant population of one-third of the total
population; ‘‘Equatorial Guinea,’’ [16]) (Fig. 3).
For the ten cases on which we have data, there is an
average of more than two nationals employed in the public
sector per privately employed national. This compares to a
typical ratio of one public employee to four or five private
employees in both developed and developing countries
[18]. Even in MRCs, public employees never constitute
more than a third of the total workforce. A citizen’s odds of
being publicly employed are hence some six to ten times
higher in HRCs than elsewhere (Fig. 4).
There is much anecdotal evidence of over-employment
and bloated bureaucracies in HRCs, as job creation is
typically driven by the need to provide jobs for new labor
market entrants rather than by administrative needs.
Administrations often perform poorly due to overstaffing
and weak incentive systems [19–24].
A survey of available primary and secondary sources
shows that HRC public sectors also typically pay much
higher salaries, offer more perks, provide higher job
security, and extract less performance than private
employers do. The pattern is strikingly uniform across
cases (Baldwin-Edwards [25]; Forstenlechner and Rutledge
[22]; Hertog [23]; Hong-Huat [26]; International Monetary
Fund [27, p. 11, 28, p. 15]; Mahabir et al. [29, pp. 8–9].
Different from developed economies, public sectors in
HRCs typically act as wage setters [20, 30, 31], shaping
nationals’ general expectations regarding salaries and work
conditions. Private sector wages in all but the highest skilled
categories are typically low and work conditions compara-
tively harsh due to competition with migrant workers. The
low-skill foreigners who satisfy most of the private labor
demand enjoy limited formal rights [17, 32–35].
As a result, most citizens evince a pronounced prefer-
ence for public sector employment and many prefer
unemployment or staying outside of the workforce to pri-
vate sector jobs [22, 26, 33, 36, 37]. Conversely, private
employers prefer foreigners.
The ironic result of government attempts to create
public jobs for everyone is low labor market participation
among nationals in most HRCs as well as high citizen
unemployment in all but the highest rent countries.
Nationals’ labor market participation in the four highest
rent Gulf monarchies ranges from 36 to 51% [25]; (total)
participation ratios reach 61% in Trinidad and Tobago [29],
60% in Gabon and 53% in Libya (World Development
Indicators). This compares with a world average of 69%.7
There are huge direct and indirect costs to surplus public
employment: a large, usually dominant share of potentially
productive national manpower is ‘‘parked’’ in jobs, whose
economic contribution is questionable. Public sector
employment policies give questionable education incen-
tives, leading to an undersupply of national skills relevant
in the private market [23]. Public sector over-employment
also creates large, unnecessary overhead costs and negative
environmental and infrastructure externalities [39]. It also
is an inequitable way of sharing the wealth: quite apart
from micro-level issues of favoritism and unequal pays-
cales, even in the richest HRCs, a significant—usually
young and/or female—segment of the population remains
structurally excluded from this form of rent distribution as
public employment policies favor older, male job seekers.
Economic development outcomes
The skewed energy and labor market structures described
above seem to have led to large macro-economic distor-
tions: descriptive statistics and simple econometrics show
that energy efficiency and labor productivity have strongly
declined over the last few decades for most HRC cases—a
result that does not obtain for mid-rent countries, where at
least per capita, subsidies are much lower.8
Figure 5 demonstrates that while economies across the
world have become more energy efficient over the last
three decades, energy intensity of production has strongly
increased in HRCs, a result that arguably at least in parts is
due to low domestic energy prices.
Relative to the rest of the world, HRC energy intensity
has increased by 150% since 1980. Saudi Arabia is now
using as much energy as the UK uses, a country with more
than twice the Saudi population and 3.6 times its GDP.
As the scatterplot below shows, the link between rents
and declining energy efficiency is statistically robust and
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Fig. 6 Rents per capita and shifts in energy intensity 1980–2010.
Source: based on World Development Indicators
7 For research linking low female labor market participation in
particular to oil income, cf. [38].
8 See footnote 4.
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not driven by individual HRCs. The relationship does
disappear if HRCs are excluded from the sample (Fig. 6).
Figure 79 shows a similar trend over time with regard to
labor productivity (defined as output per member of the
labor force), where incentives in HRCs are similarly
skewed due to the availability of low-cost foreign workers
and the limited availability of skilled national labor for
productive employment.
There is a statistically significant relationship between
rents per capita and the shift in labor productivity from
1990 to 2010 (Fig. 8).10
In line with our expectations, the one non-migrant
economy among our HRCs, Trinidad and Tobago, was the
only one to witness any substantial improvements in pro-
ductivity [40] while also maintaining relatively high citizen
labor market participation and low unemployment. Again,
the correlation disappears when HRCs are taken out of the
sample.
Some simple OLS regressions give us further confidence
in the robustness of the relationship and provide additional
hints as to the causal processes at work (data are insuffi-
cient for a full panel specification that could allow more
conclusive tests).
Table 1 shows that hydrocarbon rents per capita are a
significant and substantial predictor of a decline in pro-
ductivity from 1990 to 2010. In the simplest model, an
additional 1000 USD of rents implies a productivity loss of
about 2.6% (column 1).11 For a country with per capita
rents of 10,000 USD (which Oman, Saudi Arabia and
Equatorial Guinea are close to), the predicted loss amounts
to 22%; for a country with rents of 20,000 USD (less than
what Qatar and Kuwait had in 2013), it reaches 40%.
Just like growth, labor productivity in standard macro-
economic models is influenced by a number of structural
variables, most importantly an economy’s capital stock and
the quality of its human resources. Including gross fixed
capital formation and secondary enrolment ratios in the
model does indeed improve its fit, but hardly changes the
effect of rents (columns 2 and 3).
Rents only become insignificant when the share of
migrants in the population is added to the model, tentative
evidence that an important causal mechanism linking rents
and productivity losses might indeed be the dominance of
low-skilled foreigners on the private labor market (column
4), an argument also made by [41, 42]. As we would expect,
the share of migrants itself has a (weakly) significant nega-
tive correlation with productivity in model 4, which just
about slips into insignificance if secondary enrolment is
included as control variable, resulting in the loss of 16
observations (column 5).12None of the significant effects of
rents in Table 1 obtain if HRCs are left out of the model.
The above is suggestive rather than conclusive and does
not provide clear-cut causal identification.
In descriptive terms, it is clear, however, that growth in
HRCs has been factor-intensive, relying on rapidly growing
inputs of energy and cheap labor while witnessing declining
productivity. While the national labor force is parked in the
public sector,most of thework in the private sector is done by
cheap, low-skill, and low-productivity migrant workers.
Available studies about total factor productivity also show it
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Fig. 7 Output per member of the labor force (constant 2005 USD;
1994 = 1). Source: calculated from World Development Indicators
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Fig. 8 Shifts in labor productivity and rents per capita (1990 to
2010). Source: calculated from World Development Indicators
9 Mid-income countries are standardized at 1 in 1993 due to lack of
earlier data.
10 1990 is the earliest year for which time series data are available for
most countries.
11 Due to data limitations, we need to use recent rent per capita
figures rather than a two-decade average. For the sub-set of cases
where full data are available, the two-decade averages are closely
correlated with the 2010 value.
12 The results in models 1 and 2 survive a number of robustness tests
such as the inclusion of an OECD dummy, an Arab world dummy, the
omission of OECD cases and of the UAE as influential case; rents in
model 3 become insignificant in some of the robustness tests, but the
direction and size of the estimated effect remains similar..
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as stagnating or falling in HRCs [43–45], including in the
non-oil sector [42]. The technology development, diversifi-
cation, and private employment of nationals that all HRCs
aspire to in their development plans are not happening.
Summary
The above empirical sections have demonstrated that
HRCs form a distinct class of resource-rich state. HRCs
evince a fairly uniform pattern of costly and often
inequitable domestic rent distribution in the shape of cheap
energy (as some other developing and rentier countries also
do) and excessive public sector employment in combina-
tion with large-scale, low-skill migration (on a scale unique
to HRCs). We have argued that as a result, HRC economies
are characterized by strongly declining energy efficiency
and declining labor productivity.
The inequity and negative externalities of the status quo
should be a concern under all circumstances. Long-term
energy consumption and public employment growth,
moreover, have typically lain considerably above popula-
tion growth, creating an increasing cost burden. With the
recent reduction in oil prices, most HRCs have started to
eat into their overseas reserves, putting the fiscal sustain-
ability of their current development model into question
[46]. Insufficient investment into productive skills and
assets mean that HRCs are ill-prepared for the time when
lower oil prices force state spending to plateau and
shrink—which is already happening outside of the very
richest HRCs.
The challenge: distribution
Rent distribution in HRCs is a political fact; even the most
authoritarian ruler would find it difficult to rescind his
material obligations towards his subjects.13 Quite apart
from political exigency, the moral case for sharing national
wealth with the population is cogent, as citizens are its
rightful owners [47, 48].14 The relevant policy question
hence becomes how to reform distribution.
How should distribution be reorganized in an ideal
world? Four basic criteria appear to be relevant. Rent
recycling should:
– provide the largest and most widespread economic
welfare for citizens;
– minimize distortive incentives regarding energy con-
sumption, technology choice, and skills acquisition;
– help to integrate the citizenry into the national
economy;
– not undermine the long-term fiscal basis of the state.
The citizens’ income concept
This paper proposes a general and unconditional cash grant to
all adult HRC citizens, combined with and financed through
energy pricing and public employment reform, as the most
appropriate means to achieve the above objectives. Although
it will not by itself be able to fulfill all aims entirely, it can
achieve important improvements on all of them.
General arguments for cash grants in rentier states
There is a growing literature on cash grants as a remedy for
the ailments of resource-rich states in general, as well as a
wide literature arguing for a tax-financed, unconditional
basic income for citizens of advanced economies (for an
Table 1 OLS regressions with change in logged labor productivity 1990–2010 as dependent variable
Model 1 2 3 4 5
Hydrocarbon rents per capita (‘000 USD in 2010) -.026*** (.001) -.025*** (.009) -.021** (.009) -.007 (.013) -.005 (.013)
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP, 1990–
2010 average)
.038*** (.007) .035*** (.009) .037*** (.007) .035*** (.009)
Secondary enrolment ratio (%, 1990–2010 average) -.0006 (.001) .000 (.001)
Migrants (% of population in 2010) -.007* (.004) -.006 (.004)
Constant .259*** (.041) -.566*** (.168) -.474** (.201) -.523*** (.167) -.487** (.199)
adjusted r2 .063 .2707 .1974 .289 .2154
N 89 87 71 87 71
Standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90, 95, and 99% level, respectively
13 Only the regime in Equatorial-Guinea seems to share remarkably
little of its wealth with the wider population.
14 An unconditional basic income scheme has been supported as
compensation for the infringement of common ownership rights more
generally [49]; this argument is all the more pertinent in the rentier
state context. For a global variant of resource-based cash grants, cf.
[50].
7 Page 6 of 14 Energy Transit (2017) 1:7
123
concise statement, see [51]). The next section will quickly
review the arguments of the former; it will then draw on the
general basic income literature when discussing cash
grants’ specific implications for HRCs as well as potential
objections against them.
There are real-world precedents for regular cash grants
in a number of rentier economies, including Iran, Bolivia,
and Alaska [52, 53]. These experiences have been
accompanied by a growing discussion about subsidy
reform and cash grants for resource-rich economies in
general [47, 54]. The Center for Global Development is
undertaking a full research initiative on rent-financed cash
grants in resource-rich states.15
General arguments in favor of rentier cash grants are
numerous: compared to regressive energy subsidy systems,
they are more equitable [54], less distortive of consumption
decisions, and more transparent [55]. Compared to mean-
tested support systems, they are easier to administer, gen-
erate smaller overheads, and are less prone to stigmatiza-
tion and errors of exclusion [47].
Cash grants could keep at least part of the state’s
resource revenues out of the hands of self-interested
politicians, thereby reducing corruption [56, 57]. They
could impart a sense of ownership on citizens, increasing
their ‘‘buy in’’ into the political system [58], create a
constituency for sound natural resource management, and a
more level playing field between state and citizens (Gelb
and Grasmann [59]; Gillies [60]). Pressures for fiscal
transparency and accountability could increase [47, 54].
By providing a secure revenue stream to citizens, cash
grants could boost private investment and entrepreneurship
(Gelb and Grasmann [59]; Palley [58]; Sandbu [54]).
Authors in the cash grants literature have adduced con-
siderable evidence that private agents are adept at investing
their money well [54, 57, 61, 62].
Implications for high-rent states
The above arguments generally also apply in the HRC con-
text, although with some nuances: with the exception of
Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, corruption is a less acute
problem in HRCs than in mid-rent countries16; conversely, as
we have seen above, the need to develop private markets (and
employment) is arguably even larger. The main ambition of
this article, however, is not to scrutinize the validity of
existing rentier cash grant arguments, but to analyze such
grants’ specific and additional implications in HRCs, which
the following sections do.
Energy consumption
The rationale and implications of providing a citizens’ income
in lieu of energy subsidies are quite straightforward. Energy
subsidies favor the rich and have particularly distortive eco-
nomic effects in HRCs. The need for reforming them by now
is widely accepted across the developing world, and substi-
tuting less distortive welfare measures, including cash grants,
for cheap energy has become a standard policy recommen-
dation [6]. In fact, Iran already introduced unconditional
household cash grants as compensation for higher energy
prices from 2010 on. Although the program has met some
elite-level political resistance, popular resistance has been
limited, not least because different from mean-tested welfare
schemes, it included all citizens [6, 13, 53].17
Higher energy prices would help reduce energy con-
sumption both through immediate price effects and by
providing longer term incentives to choose more energy-
efficient technology and lifestyles. Modestly assuming that
HRC energy prices could be doubled, and using available
international estimates for the long-term price elasticity of
energy consumption [5], we can expect consumption to
decrease by between 19 and 29%.
Less consumption would both reduce negative envi-
ronmental externalities and help HRCs to preserve hydro-
carbons export capacity (or at least reduce their need to
maintain expensive extra production capacity), thereby
helping finance the cash grants. Given the highly skewed
distribution of energy consumption and the typically larger
utility of cash compared to in kind subsidies, the material
situation of the vast majority of citizens could be improved
on a fiscally neutral basis. The large elasticity estimates
also show that technology choices react strongly to price
signals; HRCs would hence likely leave the path of
declining energy efficiency and move away from subsidy-
dependent production.
Labor markets
Rationale and impact of providing an HRC citizens’ income
in return for reduced public sector employment are some-
what more complex, but of potentially even larger devel-
opmental import. As explained above, public sector over-
employment is a costly and inequitable tool of wealth dis-
tribution, undermines government effectiveness, and has
resulted in the exclusion of HRC citizens from the private
15 Cf. http://www.cgdev.org/initiative/oil-cash-fighting-resource-
curse-through-cash-transfers.
16 The average HRC score for the World Bank’s ‘‘control of
corruption’’ indicator is close to the global average of 0, while the
average for MRCs is -.9, almost a standard deviation below the
average.
17 It is somewhat different from the citizens’ income proposed here
as the Iranian grants are paid to heads of household rather than
individuals, giving it a patriarchal bias.
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labor market, which is typically dominated by cheap migrant
labor and characterized by declining labor productivity.
Creating a citizens’ income in return for more selective
public sector employment could help mitigate all of these
issues. As we will see, arguments in favor of cash grants
from the general basic income literature are more relevant
than those of the rentier cash grants debate, and apply with
particular force in the HRC context.
How would public sector employment be reduced? In
practice, it could prove difficult to dismiss significant
numbers of the existing stock of public employees, but the
grants could be used to justify much more selective and
need-based future recruitment. It should be easier to per-
suade future labor market entrants to exchange the more or
less vague hope of future public employment for a con-
crete, life-long if more modest entitlement.
Critically, in the case of incumbent public sector
employees, the citizens’ income should be incorporated
into their existing pay—which de facto already include a
strong rent sharing component—rather than be paid on top
of it. This is critical to avoid making (scarcer) government
employment even more attractive. Lower earning public
employees could receive a partial premium to compensate
them for higher energy costs.
The delinking of public employment and rent distribu-
tion would make wealth-sharing broader, less exclusive,
less discretionary, and much less distortionary in terms of
labor market incentives. Incentives provided by a citizens’
income would increase citizens’ private employment. With
unconditional cash grants, citizens would not have to take
on idle, often unrewarding government jobs to share in the
country’s wealth but would be free to pursue their own
preferences, including on the private labor market.
Although the size of the private employment effect would
depend on grant level as well as prevailing wage levels, it
is clear that with prospects of an easy public job more
remote, at least some citizens would seek other sources of
work income.
In this context, the citizens’ income would function
somewhat analogous to a general wage subsidy.18 Nationals
could achieve acceptable total income levels even if holding
less well paid jobs than currently, as their citizens’ income
would top up their private sector wages without penalty. It
would allow them to compete in lower wage labor market
segments currently dominated by migrant workers. Incentives
to perform would be stronger, as the public sector’s low effort
benchmark would be less relevant as public employment
would be less easily available.
Private jobs would also become relatively more attrac-
tive compared to government employment as the wage gap
between the two would be narrowed by the amount of the
citizens’ income. The greater attractiveness of private
employment would also incentivize nationals to seek edu-
cation and skills that are relevant in the private economy
and which HRC citizens often lack. Given the new avail-
ability of cash grants outside of the government work force,
at least some public employees would leave their jobs to
receive the citizens’ income and potentially seek private
economic opportunities on top of it—hence serving both
the purpose of reducing the public payroll and of increasing
private economic activity by citizens.
Due to its secure nature, a citizens’ income would also
give job seekers a better bargaining position vis-a`-vis
employers than conditional benefit schemes, leading to
better job market matching and potentially higher wages. A
citizens’ income would provide ‘‘…the administrative
security which will enable many people to take the risk of
accepting a job or creating their own’’ [63], raising the
level of citizen entrepreneurship that typically is very low
in HRCs.
It would also function as a quasi ‘‘study grant’’
allowing nationals to occasionally drop out of the labor
market or reduce work engagements to acquire new
skills, leading to ‘‘significantly more stepping-stone,
training-intensive, often part-time jobs,’’ thereby
improving human capital accumulation’’ (Van Parijs and
Salinas [64]; Van Parijs [63], p. 65), a particularly grave
concern in HRCs. Conversely, secure cash grants could
make hiring and firing nationals less socially and polit-
ically problematic, thereby bringing citizen employment
closer to the flexibility that employers currently enjoy
with migrant workers [23].
Economist James Meade has made the argument that a
citizens’ income in Western economies would allow full
employment without exposing low earners to unacceptably
low total incomes [65]. It is noteworthy that he argued for
such a policy in a context in which implementation would
be fiscally vastly more complex—and in which the need for
income supplements for private employees is much less
urgent, as most of private sector wages in the West are
much higher than in HRCs, despite similar levels of overall
wealth.19
Compared to a hypothetical (and unrealistic) scenario of
no wealth sharing at all, the citizens’ income would reduce
18 Not strictly analogous, as wage subsidies are only paid when an
individual is in paid employment.
19 The above arguments apply less clearly to Equatorial-Guinea,
where civil service employment is limited and hence unlikely to serve
as benchmark for citizen’s labor market behavior. The positive labor
market effects of a citizens’ income would accordingly be smaller,
and the scheme might lead citizens to drop out of the market alto-
gether. Given Equatorial-Guinea’s small formal economy and severe
poverty, cash grants would however likely have a stronger positive
impact on basic livelihood as well as micro-entrepreneurship, as they
have had in other underdeveloped countries.
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citizens’ private labor supply through a pure income
effect.20 It does potentially give recipients the option not to
work at all, especially if it is set at a high level compared to
available private salaries—a scenario that is more likely (or
feasible) among very rich HRCs such as Brunei, Kuwait,
Qatar, and the UAE. Even then, work disincentives are less
strong, however, compared to conventional means tested
support mechanisms, as unconditional grants would avoid
the substitution (or ‘‘tax’’) effects of unemployment assis-
tance or insurance and other forms of conditional income
support, where benefits are lost as work is found and/or
wages increase [39].21
A case can be made that choosing not to work, because
one is born wealthy can be a perfectly rational and optimal
decision resulting from a widened choice set, superior to
forcing citizens into meaningless jobs as a condition of rent
sharing. If we take citizens’ higher labor market partici-
pation in productive jobs as a social objective, however,
complementary reforms aimed at improving private wages
would likely be necessary. These cannot be elaborated on
here. They should, however, include improvement in
migrants’ rights, notably through allowing them mobility
between employers, which would improve migrants’ bar-
gaining position, thereby increasing prevailing wages [69].
Targeted wage subsidies could also be considered.
Migration reform would be politically and economically
easier to undertake if more skilled national labor was
available to start with—which citizens’ income and public
employment reform would contribute to. They would likely
result in better albeit fewer jobs for migrants from poor
countries—a trade-off that would result from any serious
migrant rights reform, on which there seems to be wide-
spread international consensus.
We have already alluded to some of the macro-economic
effects that a cash grant scheme combined with public sector
employment reform could have: more nationals, with typi-
cally higher skills than migrants, would join the private labor
market and the market for entrepreneurship; national human
resources would be better formed and utilized, likely leading
to higher levels of production and productivity. Businesses
themselves would have incentives for productivity
enhancements to make better use of a higher skilled labor
force. Complementary migration reform could reduce
incentives to rely on (and exploit) low-skill foreign workers,
further motivating businesses to invest in technology and
processes that can use better-skilled workers.
A quick note is to differentiate the citizens’ income idea
from reforms currently underway in the MENA region. At
the time of writing, Saudi Arabia was about to roll out a
household cash grant system to compensate citizens for
future energy price increases.22 Different from the citizens’
income, these cash grants will a) be mean-tested and b) not
be tied to public employment or other labor market
reforms. While mean-testing can in principle make com-
pensation schemes fiscally cheaper, they are administra-
tively complex, especially in countries without an
established income tax system. Mean-tested grants also
create incentives against work and skill acquisition, as such
benefits are lost as other sources of income improve. More
generally, mean-tested benefits are less secure for indi-
viduals than an unconditional grant providing a guaranteed
share in national wealth. Unconditional grants will argu-
ably make other distributional reforms, such as public
employment reforms, more widely acceptable among citi-
zens. While conditional compensation grants are a step
forward, they remain only a partial fix for the broader
distortions created by HRC wealth sharing. Universal
grants provide a more comprehensive reform option.
Addressing counterarguments from the basic
income literature
There are many potential counterarguments to cash grant
schemes, both from the general basic income literature and
from the literature on rentier cash grants in particular. The
following section will address both in turn, showing that
neither set of arguments applies for HRCs.
The most prominent arguments against ‘‘basic income’’
schemes relate to tax rates, labor market incentives, and
redistribution (see [51] for an overview). A basic income in
the West, as well as lower rent countries under at least
some proposals [47, 54], would require significantly higher
tax rates on middle to high earners, which could lead to
battles over redistribution and reduced political feasibil-
ity—one main drawback of basic income schemes com-
pared to other policies [64]. In rentier countries, by
contrast, the basic challenge is not how to raise revenue
and from whom, but rather how to distribute the existing
20 Some experimental studies in the West have shown that income
maintenance schemes have a modest negative effect on the working
hours of beneficiaries. Some of this modest effect appears to be due to
rising marginal taxes (i.e. a substitution effect), which would not
apply in HRCs (cf. [66, 67]). More recent pilot projects in developing
countries—in admittedly quite different socio-economic contexts—
have shown no effect on or increases in economic activity among
recipients of a basic income [47, 61, 68]. In any case, the income
effect for more productive workers with higher earnings will be
smaller, as the grants will constitute a smaller part of their overall
income, further tempering its aggregate impact [47].
21 Targeted subsidies for low-wage workers (like the Earned Income
Tax Credit in the U.S.) would have weaker incentive effects relative
to the citizens’ income, reducing work effort and incentives to
upgrade one’s skills.
22 See vision2030.gov.sa/sites/default/files/attachments/
BB2020_EN.pdf.
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rent that accrues from outside of the local economy [70].
HRC fiscal policy by definition is a voluntarist regime that
is forced to make decisions on allocation; there is no
(immediate) need to build up and justify the extraction of
resources from richer strata of society.
Globalization is also seen as a challenge to basic income
schemes, as high taxes could drive capital and highly
qualified labor out of the country; another issue that does
not apply to HRCs [71]. To avoid the politics of taxation,
[64] in fact consider the creation of a basic income from
some common asset among advanced economies, but
concede that this would likely not yield enough revenue. In
HRCs, by contrast, it certainly would.
A tax-financed citizens’ income in a system with pro-
gressive taxation would potentially decrease work incen-
tives for mid- and high earners [39, 51]. A basic income
implies a ‘‘principled though partial disconnection between
labor and income’’ [63]. This again is not the case for
HRCs, at least as far as productive work is concerned: as
we have argued above, a well-designed citizens’ income
would in fact substantially increase private sector work
incentives for HRC nationals compared to the status quo.
Closely related, the moral argument that a citizens’
income creates a system of free-riders clinging to the
coattail of taxpayers does not apply in the HRC scenario
[72]. Critics of basic income schemes in the West paint a
gloomy picture of an army of idle or near idle citizens
living off state-provided payments. In most HRCs, how-
ever, the idle armies already exist—including significant
parts of the public sector—and are supported in very
inequitable ways. There would be fewer of them under a
citizens’ income.
We have mentioned above that a citizens’ income
would have an income effect, which could potentially
reduce citizens’ desired work hours compared to a
hypothetical scenario of radical austerity (and, in the
status quo scenario, for the small number of nationals
already privately employed). It is, however, not clear
whether maximizing individuals’ hours of work is really a
socially desirable goal (Segal [47], p. 484f). This is
especially the case in HRCs: as we have seen above, there
is currently a shortage of reasonably paid private sector
work for HRC nationals. Spreading the available jobs
across a broader population with relatively shorter
working hours might be a good idea. While in tax-based
production states, more work effort tends to beget a
growing economy and more work opportunities, this link
is less strong in HRCs, where much growth and demand
will remain driven by exogenous rents and resulting state
spending for a long time. Basic income proponents have
made the argument for cash grants as a ‘‘soft strategy for
job sharing’’ [63], a particularly relevant point for small
HRC labor markets (Fig. 4).
Counterarguments from the rentier cash grant
literature
The literature on cash grants in conventional rentier states
also (both implicitly and explicitly) points to a number of
potential weaknesses of such schemes. Many authors, for
example, assume that individuals will use cash more
smartly than governments. A citizens’ income in HRCs
does not necessarily require this assumption, as its
objective of incentivizing citizens to join the private labor
market would obtain independently of how citizens would
spend their grants. As important, HRC cash grants could
be financed through subsidy reforms and reduced public
sector recruitment, thereby attacking particularly ineffi-
cient ways of using public resources. Closely related, the
argument that cash grants could ‘‘deny a cash strapped
government the opportunity of improving the delivery of
its services to its citizens’’ [73] or to build critical
infrastructure (Alan Gelb and Majerowicz [61], p. 9) is
less relevant for HRCs, whose delivery of public services
and infrastructure spending could remain untouched as
subsidies and surplus public sector employment are
reduced.
Similarly, at least some variants of the rentier cash grant
proposal assume that distributing rents through cash grants
will require governments to raise taxes to pay for hitherto
rent-financed activities [47, 54, 57, 60]. While creating a
broad-based tax system is a worthwhile long-term objec-
tive for HRCs too, it is not a necessary requirement for the
creation of a citizens’ income. This drastically increases
the latter’s political and administrative feasibility.
Many of the supporting arguments for rentier cash
grants—such as the developmental utility of building tax-
ation capacity, the creation of a sense of citizen ownership
that leads to enforcement of transparency and governance
(which are critiqued in [73])—are not required for the
citizens’ income to make sense in HRCs, which also stands
on other merits.
A final critique of rentier cash grants in the literature is
that they might not be administratively feasible in weak
states [74]. There are general counterarguments against
this: many low-capacity administrations have rolled out
wide-ranging systems of cash transfers using new tech-
nologies such as biometric identification, smartcards, and
payments into mobile bank accounts [47, 55, 61]. In any
case, with the exception of Equatorial Guinea and to some
extent Gabon, HRCs generally have stronger administra-
tive capacity than low- to mid-rent countries.23
Two more counterarguments not present in the literature
are worth considering: first, one potential danger of creat-
ing a citizens’ income is that it might in the future again be
23 See footnote 21.
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complemented by other, less efficient ways of rent circu-
lation. This is why the simultaneous implementation of
cash grants and subsidy and public employment reforms is
crucial, and why public awareness of this quid pro quo
needs to be built before any reforms. It might be difficult to
prevent inefficient patronage from seeping back into the
system later on—but the expansion of distortive forms of
wealth sharing would be even more likely under a con-
tinuation of the status quo scenario. A citizens’ income
would guarantee that at least some of the government’s
distributional spending is minimally distortive. A citizens’
income would also allow a much clearer and more effective
government position to ward off demands for future mass
patronage than is possible under the current distributional
setup.
Second, HRC rulers might just be so self-interested and
politically autonomous as to avoid almost any meaningful
distribution to the population, thereby making them disin-
terested in equity and efficiency of distribution. This seems
to be the case in Equatorial Guinea [75]. This problem,
however, is not specific to the citizens’ income idea: in such
cases, no policy prescription about how resources should
best be used is of immediate practical relevance, and one
might have to wait for a ruler’s survival or intended legacy
to become contingent on the welfare of his population.
The latter argument is in any case less relevant in case
like the GCC monarchies, where wealth sharing is well
established. If an HRC regime has any interest in better
resource allocation, a citizens’ income should in principle be
politically feasible as it would create many more winners
than losers. [60], moreover, has argued that ‘‘the costs of
allocating revenues to citizens will be lower if the leader
enjoys some autonomy from inter-factional political com-
petition and if the resource rent is sustainably large.’’ The
former is the case in all HRCs, the latter arguably in most of
them, as they are typically small, non-democratic, central-
ized, and face low levels of political mobilization in society.
Policy design and feasibility
There is no space here for a detailed discussion of a citizen
income’s practical policy design—a subject for future
work. We will nevertheless venture some preliminary
observations on grant level, transition arrangements, and
financing, which are critical for labor market impact,
political, and fiscal feasibility.
The level of the citizens’ income should ideally be fixed
quasi-permanently or at least for a considerable period, the
latter possibly by tying it to a long-term moving average of
resource income (or subsidy savings). Only this way will
consistent labor market planning be possible for both
government and individuals; for the scheme to have its full
incentive effects, HRC citizens need a constant,
predictable income stream.24 A long-term moving average
would also allow countries facing reserve depletion to
phase out cash grants over time.
At the same time, the scheme might have to be phased in
gradually, at least if it is to be financed by subsidy
reductions which in turn need to be undertaken in an
orderly fashion to allow households and businesses to
adjust to new prices. Energy subsidy reforms should be
gradual also to allow the wages of migrants to catch up
with the resulting cost of living increases—which in turn
would be facilitated also by an improvement in migrant
workers’ labor rights.25
Financing options for a citizens’ income could vary from
case to case. Detailed country by country estimates are
beyond the scope of this article. To give a sense of the
possible magnitudes involved, however, Table 2 shows the
estimated size of a monthly cash grant for all adults age 20
and older who are not employed in government that could be
financed through the complete removal of energy subsidies
as estimated by the IMF for 2011.26 Figures are particularly
high in countries with large foreign populations.
In some cases, the grant level would be more than enough
to bridge the gaps between citizen wages in the public
sector, citizen wages in the private sector, and migrant
wages in the private sector—even if we allow for the fact
that global energy prices and hence implicit subsidies have
dropped since 2011. In the UAE, for example, average cit-
izen wages in 2009 were 5400 USD in government and 3600
Table 2 Monthly citizens’
incomes financed by removal of
pre-tax energy subsidies (USD,
2011)
Bahrain 1141
Brunei 411
Equatorial Guinea 26
Gabon 8
Kuwait 4642
Libya 290
Oman 394
Qatar 10,072
Saudi Arabia 924
Trinidad and Tobago 77
UAE 5811
Source based on IMF, World
Bank, various national reports
24 Against this background, a recent proposal of one-off grants for
citizens once they reach maturity appears only a second-best solution
[76].
25 Governments could also consider providing continued subsidized
energy for small households, i.e. up to a certain (low) monthly level
of consumption.
26 The assumption is that any energy not used domestically as a result
of higher prices could be exported internationally; at least in the short
run, this will not be the case for large exporters like Saudi Arabia; the
figures for them hence are upper boundary estimates.
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USD in the private sector, while (typically less educated)
migrant workers earned an average of 700 USD in the pri-
vate market. Even half of the citizens’ incomes estimated in
Table 2 would more than bridge the numerical distance
between wages in different sectors. Assuming that at least
better earning civil servants are excluded from the cash
grants, private labor would become significantly more
attractive for citizens, while at the same time, they could
lower their gross reservation wages to become more com-
petitive with foreign workers.
In Saudi Arabia, average citizen wages in early 2017
were 2800 USD in government and 2000 USD in the pri-
vate sector, while foreign workers earned an average of
1000 USD in the private market. The estimated cash grant
of more than 900 USD in 2011 would roughly bridge both
gaps. Cash grants based on current subsidy levels would be
lower but still cover a substantial part of the gap.
Even where subsidy reforms could finance only modest
cash grants, savings from reduced public sector hiring and
gradual attrition of public employment would kick in over a
longer period, making the citizens’ income more substantial.
In the interim period, governments could use targeted tools
like wage subsidies to incentivize citizen job seekers to
orient themselves towards the private labor market.
In the long run, the citizens’ income could potentially be
financed entirely out of returns on the sovereign wealth of
at least the richer HRCs, and thereby be turned into a
permanent revenue stream independent of short-term
hydrocarbons price fluctuations. This would address issues
of inter-generational equity raised by the depletable nature
of resource. Such a sovereign wealth scheme has again be
proposed for financing basic income provisions in
advanced economies [77], but would be much more sub-
stantial and more easily justified in HRCs.
Conclusion and outlook
The ambition of this paper has been twofold: a) to docu-
ment patterns of resource distribution in high-rent countries
(HRCs) and their distinct developmental consequences,
which put HRCs into a class of their own within the rentier
state universe and (b) to propose cash grants in combina-
tion with energy subsidy and public employment reform as
a mitigation strategy to minimize the negative impact of
rent distribution in HRCs. These policies would improve
resource efficiency and productivity, enable entrepreneur-
ship, help to integrate nationals into the private labor
market without exposing them to socially unacceptable in-
come levels, facilitate political compromise between social
classes, and help put HRCs onto a fiscally sustainable path.
Much further work is required on country-level policy
design and quantitative estimates of the impact of different
policy packages. Implications and justifications of a citi-
zens’ income will differ somewhat from case to case, but
arguments in favor are always strong: this paper’s new,
HRC-specific arguments are most applicable to HRCs with
both large subsidies and public employment (Brunei, Libya
and the Gulf monarchies). For the other cases, a different
mix of rationales applies, including the existing arguments
from the broader cash grants literature, many of the
counterarguments to which are less pertinent in the case of
HRCs. In the case of Equatorial Guinea and Gabon in
particular, cash grants can be justified with weak gover-
nance and limited capacity to make good public use of
resources, and the fact that relative abundance lessens
concerns over having to cut government programs or to
immediately create a broad-based taxation system.
Quite apart from future research on HRCs themselves,
their conceptualization as a distinct category raises
important questions for the broader resource curse litera-
ture: due to their large resource income, these cases likely
have an outsize importance for many of the statistical
studies in the resource curse literature. This article has
shown that the characteristics and maladies of mid-rent and
high-rent countries might be quite distinct; conflating the
two could hence easily lead to invalid conclusions. Inves-
tigating the extent to which existing results might be driven
by distinct sub-sets of resource-rich countries is hence
another important avenue of future research.
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